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Insurance has done more than all gifts of impulsive charity to foster a 
sense of human brotherhood and of common interests. It has done more 
than all repressive legislation to destroy the gambling spirit. It is impos- 
sible to conceive of our civilization in its full vigour and progressive 
power without this principle, which unites the fundamental law of practi- 
cal economy, that he best serves humanity who best serves himself, with 
the golden rule of religion, “Bear ye one another’s burdens.” 
-William  Cow, “Insurance,” Encyclopedia Bn‘tannica (1 Ith ed.,  1910) 
This paper examines the optimal design of reinsurance-insurance  for insur- 
ers. Reinsurance enables insurers to lay off concentrated positions in idiosyn- 
cratic risks and places risks that are large for society as a whole in the hands 
of those best able to bear them. We examine how reinsurance can be designed 
to meet these purposes. Although our focus is on reinsurance, much of what 
we discuss is widely relevant to primary-insurance markets as well. 
Reinsurance is valuable for insurers because it allows them to reduce their 
risk levels. If  an insurance company is concentrated in a risk in a particular 
geographic area, for example, then a disaster affecting everyone in that area 
may severely reduce the insurance company’s reserves. We term a situation of 
threatened or actual insurer insolvency in the event of an adverse risk a cutus- 
trophe. 
The first question that we address is, How should reinsurance premiums 
and reimbursement be designed to address the potential for catastrophes? This 
question is complicated because the primary insurer is likely to know much 
more about the true loss distribution than will the reinsurer. As a result, adverse 
selection is a concern. We  show that optimal policies in the face of  adverse 
selection depend on the nature of the information asymmetry. When the asym- 
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metry is on the probability of a loss but not its magnitude, the optimal reinsur- 
ance contract is a standard “excess-of-loss” policy-the  primary insurer is re- 
sponsible for small risks, and the reinsurer is responsible for large risks. When 
the asymmetry is over the magnitude of the loss, the optimal reinsurance policy 
covers smaller losses as well as large losses but leaves the primary insurer ex- 
posed for some large losses. The striking difference between these policies sug- 
gests that one cannot make broad statements about the optimal form of reinsur- 
ance policies. 
As the size of  catastrophes increases, a second difficulty with reinsurance 
markets emerges. If the underlying risk is large in aggregate, the reinsurance 
industry as a whole may not be able to provide sufficient capital to cover a loss. 
Hence, wide-scale insolvencies may be threatened, and insurance may become 
unavailable or excessively priced. We term an event that strains worldwide in- 
surance and reinsurance industry reserves-arbitrarily  defined as an event with 
$5 billion or more of insured losses-a  cataclysm.‘ 
The second question that we address is, Who should provide reinsurance 
for cataclysmic events? By definition, the reinsurance industry will be poor at 
reinsuring cataclysms. We  argue that cataclysms must be reinsured either in 
broader financial markets or by the government, or both. The second part of 
the paper explores these options. 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in the next section by outlining 
the nature of the problem. In the second section, we consider quantitatively the 
size of property-casualty insurance and reinsurance markets. In the third sec- 
tion, we deal with the problem of reinsuring catastrophes. In the fourth section, 
we consider reinsurance of cataclysms. The last section concludes. 
6.1  The Nature of the Problem 
To understand the nature of our analysis, consider a particular example: the 
market for homeowner’s insurance. Fire damage is one risk  facing insurers 
underwriting homeowner’s policies. If the insurer is sufficiently big, given that 
the risks being insured are for the most part uncorrelated, internal diversifica- 
tion will provide sufficient diversification for this risk. Reinsurance is internal. 
Other risks will not be diversifiable in this fashion, however. For example, a 
large hurricane or earthquake will affect all the houses in a broad geographic 
area. If  insurers are concentrated in particular areas, for example, because of 
differences in sales-force concentration or underwriting knowledge,2  they may 
be overly exposed to particular risks. Thus, insurers concentrating in California 
may find themselves with excessive amounts of earthquake risk, while insurers 
predominantly in Florida may be overly exposed to humcane risk. Adding ad- 
1. More generally, a cataclysm occurs when the size of a loss is large relative to the insurance 
2. With  insurance, as opposed to most other goods, characteristics of  the purchaser  matter. 
pool for that category of  risk. 
Hence, knowledge of  local conditions provides for local economies of scale. 235  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
ditional houses in California or Florida to the pool will not help diversify risk 
if an earthquake or a hurricane will damage all houses. 
This excessive concentration  will  be undesirable  for the insurance com- 
pany’s shareholders if the firm is a stock company and the shareholders’ port- 
folios are not otherwise diver~ified,~  or for its policyholders  if  the firm is a 
mutual.  Such concentration  may  even risk the insurer’s bankruptcy, putting 
recovery for its insureds at risk.4 
Reinsurance can help insurers diversify their excessive concentration in par- 
ticular  markets.  For example, insurers  in California and Florida can  swap 
earthquake and hurricane risk, or both sets of insurers could sell risks to third 
companies, including specialty reinsurers, perhaps in other countries. We term 
this role for reinsurance the catastrophe role. A catastrophe is bigger than any 
one insurer can handle but not big enough to upset the entire insurance market. 
A catastrophe is defined as an event with at least $5 million in insured damages 
that affects the policyholders of  many different insurance companies (Insur- 
ance Information Institute 1996a).5 A $10 million loss at one company, for 
example, may be large for that company, but for the industry as a whole it is a 
minor event. Pooling of catastrophic losses is the traditional role for reinsur- 
ance. 
A major difficulty with catastrophic reinsurance  is adverse selection. An 
insurer who is buying risk protection for his portfolio will have superior infor- 
mation about the risks he holds, partly because he was more knowledgeable at 
the time the risk was written and partly because of his subsequent experience. 
If diversification is the goal, the ideal seller would be a company whose own 
book is quite different in its holdings$ naturally, such a seller is likely to be 
poorly informed about true risk levels. Both seller ignorance and buyer superi- 
ority of information suggest that adverse selection will be a problem (Akerlof 
1970). 
Moral hazard may  also be a concern with reinsurance. Insurers that have 
purchased reinsurance may have differing incentives to sign up particular in- 
sureds, monitor the precautions that their insureds take, or fight potential litiga- 
tion. We leave these issues of moral hazard for later analysis. 
Until recent years, adverse selection was compounded because reinsurance 
was transacted more on a relationship basis-insurers  and reinsurers dealt fre- 
quently on a business and social level-than  on a scientific basis. In such a 
market, it is easy to see how private information may be exploited. Reinsurers 
3. If shareholders have well-diversified portfolios, a good deal of risk spreading can be achieved 
by  having companies bear the risk of losses and passing them on, in turn, to their shareholders. 
We suspect that this is how a large amount of risk is ultimately diversified. 
4.  Insurance managers are in an agency relationship with policyholders. Bankruptcy in response 
to a massive loss is probably a larger relative loss for policyholders. If, as seems likely, policyhold- 
ers cannot monitor sufficiently, insufficient reinsurance purchases may result. For related reasons, 
states impose solvency requirements on insurers. 
5.  The loss threshold for a catastrophe was raised to $25 million in 1997. 
6.  This is why reinsurance at the international level is an important phenomenon. 236  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
today rely much more on statistical methods, risk models, et~.~  No matter how 
hard reinsurers try to learn about the relevant information, however, adverse 
selection  remains a  concern.  Consider an extreme case-where  reinsurers 
know more about the underlying risk being insured than does the primary in- 
surer. Suppose that the risk being insured is commercial liability. The insurer 
may  still have relevant private information-how  likely the particular com- 
pany being underwritten is to file for a claim; how aggressive it will be in legal 
actions; how competent the executives are; etc. Reinsurer information will be 
reflected in competitive market prices for the risks being insured, but, within 
that risk class, private information possessed by the primary insurer may still 
influence when reinsurance is purchased. 
Often, the risk being insured is so large that the aggregate risk exposure of 
the worldwide insurance industry is dangerously high, even if risks were fully 
reinsured. Hurricane Andrew, the largest U.S. catastrophe on record, cost in- 
surers $15.5 billion. Had Andrew hit Miami rather than less densely populated 
parts of South Florida, the losses could have been at least three times as large. 
The second largest catastrophe on record was the Northridge Earthquake of 
1994, with insured losses of about $12.5 billion. Had the earthquake hit Los 
Angeles or San Francisco, the damage could well have been over $50 billion. 
If a major earthquake hit Tokyo, the losses could approach $1 trillion. Beyond 
natural disasters, the cost to insurers of toxic waste cleanup may reach as high 
as $30-$50  billion (Insurance Information Institute 1996b). The potential for 
cataclysms to strike insurance markets is very real. 
When cataclysms strike, insurers may be undercapitalized, and widespread 
insolvencies may result. To avoid such a situation, insurers might decide not 
to underwrite particular risks. For example, some insurers-such  as Nation- 
wide-no  longer write hurricane insurance in Florida. Others may refuse to 
cover various environmental, product safety, or other risks that stretch years 
into the future (long-tailed risks). When terrorist bombings struck London in 
1992, for example, reinsurers and insurers immediately stopped insuring ter- 
rorism damage. Less drastic measures to curtail exposure to cataclysms would 
be to switch from occurrence to claims-made policies (from year of the acci- 
dent to year of the lawsuit) and to write policies for short periods of time. The 
net result of  such actions would be to limit or dry up reinsurance markets, 
which in turn would dry up insurance and thus stifle economic activity. 
Why  do insurers  and  reinsurers  not  merely  raise  rates  when  new  risks 
emerge or old risks appear to be greater in magnitude? There are two answers. 
First, implicit and explicit regulatory  constraints may  prevent this.  Second, 
insurers appear to be extremely risk averse about open-ended risks, and the 
risk premium required for them to continue bearing this risk would therefore 
be prohibitively expensive. 
7. We are grateful to participants at the conference for discussing the actual operation of reinsur- 
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By  definition, the reinsurance  market cannot provide coverage for cata- 
clysms. Reinsuring such risks requires new institutional forms. While $10 bil- 
lion is large relative to the insurance markets, it is tiny relative to asset markets 
as a whole. The total value of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
for example, is over $6 trillion, and the aggregate value of  assets in capital 
markets in the United States is estimated at more than $10 trillion. Thus, one 
possibility would be to diversify cataclysms through broader capital markets, 
and some recent steps have been taken in that direction. Cataclysms can also 
be dealt with through government reinsurance-and  have been in many na- 
tions. The government has the advantage that it can diversify losses over time 
and over broader groups of people than the investors in asset markets. Section 
6.4 below explores the role of reinsurance for cataclysms, looking in particular 
at publicly provided reinsurance. 
6.2  Reinsurance Markets and Potential Losses 
Before considering the design of reinsurance policies, we start with a discus- 
sion of reinsurance markets and the potential for cataclysmic losses. 
6.2.1 
Property-casualty insurance-ranging  from fire insurance to products liabil- 
ity-is  a $300 billion per year industry. Reinsurance is a much smaller but still 
significant feature of property-casualty insurance. In 1994, about $140 billion 
of insurance was reinsured to an affiliate of the primary insurer, and $47 billion 
was reinsured to nonaffiliates (A. M. Best 1996). 
Reinsurance is written by  reinsurance departments of  primary insurers as 
well as specialty reinsurers (the most famous of which is Lloyd’s of London). 
Specialty reinsurers account for about $12 billion of premium income annu- 
ally. While primary insurers tend to write primarily in their own country, re- 
insurance is a much more international business. Nearly half the reinsurance 
ceded by U.S. insurers to nonaffiliates is ceded to international reinsurers. The 
leading reinsurance markets are the United States, London, and, increasingly, 
Bermuda (Giles 1994; Insurance Information Institute 1996~). 
Table 6.1 shows which lines of insurance are reinsured most heavily. The 
first column shows direct premiums written. The second column shows all pre- 
mium cedings to both affiliates and nonaffiliates.* The third column shows 
cedings to nonaffiliates only. The largest property-casualty categories are auto 
liability (direct premiums of $8 1 billion) and automobile physical damage (di- 
rect premiums of $43 billion). Reinsurance for automobile losses is compara- 
tively rare; less than  10 percent of the premiums are ceded to nonaffiliates. 
The Size of Reinsurance Markets 
8. The amount of  reinsurance can be greater than direct insurance written since risk may be 
ceded to affiliates and then further ceded to nonaffiliates. This transaction would be counted twice 
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Table 6.1  Size of the Property-Casualty  Insurance and Reinsurance 
Industries, 1995 
Reinsurance Ceded as a 
Percentage of Direct Business 
Line of Business 
Direct Business  Affiliates and  Nonaffiliates 
($ billion)  Nonaffiliates  Only 
Automobile liability 
Automobile physical damage 
Workers’ compensation 
Home/fam multiple peril 
Products and other liability 











































Total  273  61  16 
Source: A. M. Best. 
“Fire,  allied lines, inland marine, earthquake, glass, burglary, and theft. 
bCredit,  accident and health, international, other. 
“Ocean  marine, aircraft (all perils), boiler and machinery. 
This makes sense; automobile losses result from thousands of independent ac- 
cidents, so diversification is accomplished internally. The one major risk asso- 
ciated with automobile accidents is that the litigation climate will change. Un- 
der our present system, where premiums are set annually, this risk is primarily 
borne by drivers, who incur any yearly variability in expected losses. Reinsur- 
ance is most common for special liability (ocean marine, aircraft, boiler and 
machinery), special property (fire, earthquake, etc.), and products and other li- 
ability. With some exceptions, these risks tend to be more correlated across in- 
dividuals or over time than is automobile liability. 
Most reinsurance is written on a “treaty” basis-reinsurance  is provided 
for all exposures for a specific class or multiple classes of  busine~s.~  Treaty 
reinsurance is generally of two types. The first type is proportional  reinsur- 
ance; the reinsurer agrees to assume a share of the risk in exchange for a share 
of the premiums. Typically, the ceding company retains 30 percent or less of 
the original risk. The second type of reinsurance is excess-of-loss reinsurance; 
the ceding company retains risk up to some amount, and then reinsurance pays 
above that. Excess-of-loss reinsurance  is often purchased  in layers. For ex- 
9. For more discussion of reinsurance policies, see Conning & Co. (1993). 239  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
ample, a company might purchase a layer of reinsurance for $1.5 million in 
excess of  $500,000-that  is, the reinsurer assumes risks between $500,000 
and $2 million. Excess-of-loss reinsurance has a greater orientation toward ca- 
tastrophe protection than does proportional reinsurance. We analyze both these 
forms of insurance below. 
6.2.2  The Potential for Cataclysms 
We term events that would exhaust the reserves of worldwide insurers in a 
particular risk market cataclysms. We arbitrarily call a loss cataclysmic if it ex- 
ceeds $5 billion. Much of the concern about reinsurance markets is related to 
the potential for cataclysmic losses. It is useful to understand how these po- 
tential losses might arise and what their magiiitudes might be. 
Cataclysmic losses can arise in two ways. The first is “single-event’’ cata- 
clysms, such as a major earthquake in San Francisco or Tokyo that imposes 
sufficiently large losses to exhaust insurer capital. The second is what we label 
a common-risk cataclysm-a  relatively small adverse change in a risk that af- 
fects large numbers of people and thus imposes large expected losses on insur- 
ers as a whole. Changes in climatic conditions that increase the probability of 
a hurricane but not the damage per hurricane are an example of  a common- 
risk cataclysm; increases in tort-liability judgments for a given accident size 
and type are another.l0 With either type of  cataclysm, unfolding events may 
provide significant information about underlying, possibly changing, risk lev- 
els. If  so, as we shall see in section 6.4 below, risks about future premiums 
levels may be significant. 
Single-Event Cataclysms 
We consider the potential for single-event cataclysms using data from 1949 
to 1994 compiled by Property Claim Services (PCS). Damages should natu- 
rally increase over time as the value of the asset being insured-generally  house 
prices-rise.  To express losses on a consistent basis over time, we follow Cum- 
mins, Lewis, and Phillips (chap. 3 in this volume) and inflate losses to 1994 
dollars using the growth of aggregate house values in each state and year.” 
PCS has raised the threshold for a catastrophe over time; we cannot adjust 
for this, but we suspect that threshold changes do not have a major effect on 
the time series of  losses. Cataclysmic losses are dominated by  several large 
events. In 1992, losses were almost $25 billion, largely because of Hurricane 
Andrew. Losses were nearly $20 billion in 1994, with a substantial share from 
the Northridge Earthquake. Losses were nearly $10 billion in  1989 (Hurri- 
cane Hugo). 
10. Common risk from changing liability rules is sometimes referred to as social injution. 
11. Updating by aggregate house values factors in three terms: population growth, overall price 
inflation, and the growth of real house values. We are grateful to David Cummins, Christopher 
Lewis, and Richard Phillips for supplying us with their data. 240  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Year 
Fig. 6.1 
Note:  Data  are  from  Property  Claim  Services as adjusted  by  Cummins,  Lewis,  and Phillips 
(chap. 3 in this volume). 
Catastrophickataclysmic  losses over time 
Cataclysmic damages have increased over time. There were two large losses 
in the 1950s (windstorm damage in the Northeast and Middle Atlantic in 1950 
and two humcanes hitting the Northeast and Middle Atlantic in 1954) but no 
losses of even $7 billion between  1955 and 1988. Since 1989, however, cata- 
clysmic losses have been much larger. On the basis of  figure 6.1, an insurer 
thinking about pooling cataclysmic losses over many years could not be confi- 
dent of  setting appropriate premiums  since past losses do not seem to be a 
reliable indicator of future losses. 
The nature of the risk greatly affects the potential for cataclysms. We com- 
pare losses from two types of events-windstorms  and hurricanes.'2 Wind- 
12. Data on losses by catastrophe are available only through 1994. In some years, there are no 
catastrophic  losses from  hurricanes.  We  assume  that  catastrophe  losses  for  hurricanes  were 
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Fig. 6.2  Cumulative probability of damage from windstorms and hurricanes 
Note: Data  are  from Property  Claim  Services as adjusted  by  Cummins,  Lewis,  and Phillips 
(chap. 3 in this volume). 
storm damage averages $1.2 billion annually; hurricane damage is substan- 
tially less, with an average of $97 million annually. The variance of hurricane 
damage is much greater, however. The standard deviation of windstorm dam- 
age is 90 percent, compared to 340 percent for hurricane damage. 
To determine what these different variances imply, figure 6.2 graphs the cu- 
mulative probability of loss for each type of risk on the basis of a lognormal 
model of  expected 10sses.'~  For windstorms, the probability of only minimal 
damage (less than $500 million in aggregate) is only 25 percent, and the proba- 
bility of a $10 billion loss-twice  our cataclysmic level-is  about 0.5 percent. 
In contrast, the probability of minimal hurricane damage is nearly two-thirds, 
while the probability of  $10 billion of losses is about 8 percent. Indeed, the 
loss distribution from humcanes has an extremely wide tail; the probability of 
a $20 billion hurricane, for example, is over 5 percent. Thus, while cataclysmic 
13. Clearly, we have very little information about major cataclysms, so the lognormal might not 
be the best approximation to the true distribution in the tails, which is the primary concern. Cum- 
mins, Lewis, and Phillips (chap. 3 in this volume) show that the lognormal model fits the tails of 
the distribution nearly as well as do more flexible distributions. 242  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
windstorm damage does not appear to be a major concern, the possibility of a 
cataclysmic humcane is very real. 
Common-Risk Cataclysms 
The probability of  common-risk cataclysms is more difficult to judge, in 
part  because  common-risk cataclysms  may  result from a number of  small 
events rather than one large event. For example, knowledge about which chem- 
icals are dangerous is formed only over time. Similarly, legal rulings regarding 
insurer liability for hazardous products do not change all at once but are refined 
gradually in a series of judicial and appellate decisions. The cumulative effect 
of such small events can be very large. Indeed, it has been widely argued that 
legal changes in the 1970s and 1980s represented a cataclysmic change (see, 
e.g., Huber 1988; Viscusi et al. 1993).14  The likelihood of a common-risk cat- 
aclysm is also hard to project because common-risk cataclysms  tend to be 
unique events. We do not expect new liability revolutions such as we have seen 
in recent decades. 
Not all  common-risk cataclysms develop slowly, however.  For example, 
when the first terrorist incident happened in London in 1992, insurers and re- 
insurers were quick to perceive this as a major area of potential loss. 
Often, common-risk cataclysms evolve over time, with a significant compo- 
nent of  risk relating to the insurance coverage itself. For example, an insurance 
company might insure any malpractice claim in the future filed against its in- 
sured physicians in the policy year-termed  an occurrence-based policy. Or 
insurers could underwrite protection from the financial consequences of  leak- 
age over the next twenty years from hazardous waste disposed this year. These 
types of long-tailed risks are particularly susceptible to the arrival of damaging 
new information or changes in legal and judicial interpretations. For example, 
we may learn that products previously thought safe actually damage humans- 
as with asbestos or the Dalkon shield-or  are effectively treated that way by 
the legal system.I5 Or legal rulings could expand an insurer’s liability beyond 
what it thought it had committed to-as  with environmental liability. 
It is not even clear that these long-term risks can be measured by insurers, 
let alone priced. Risk, as it is conventionally defined, assumes that insurers 
know the probability of a loss and its expected size. As the period of insurance 
14. It is important for policy purposes to differentiate between two factors. One thing that we 
learned over recent decades is that many things once thought safe-e.g.,  asbestos in buildings- 
are not in fact  safe. Coupled with that is the assignment of  liability once we have discovered 
damages. For insurance losses, the distinction between these two is irrelevant. The distinction is 
important for public policy purposes, however, because, while assigning risk ex post is just a 
transfer from one person to another, discovering a new set of  toxic chemicals is a net cost to 
society that someone must pay. By definition, one group of people or another will be worse off. 
15. For a discussion of legal and scientific evaluations of the safety of silicone-gel breast im- 
plants, see Angel1 (1996).  Despite the lack of scientific evidence of risk from breast implants, there 
are likely to be multi-billion-dollar recoveries. 243  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
coverage increases, however, each of  these values becomes more uncertain. 
Zeckhauser  (1  99  1) distinguishes between  risk, the common basis  for insur- 
ance, Knightian uncertuin9, in which insurers know the events they are insur- 
ing but not their probability, and ignorance, in which even the events them- 
selves are not well defined. 
Fire insurance is overwhelmingly risk based. An example of Knightian un- 
certainty might be insurance against workplace accidents. The fact that work- 
place accidents may  occur is well known, but the potential medical cost for 
workplace accidents several years in the future is not well known. Thus, the 
costs associated with work accidents several years in the future are uncertain. 
The potential for legal or legislative changes in liability is an example of igno- 
rance. The provisions of the Superfund legislation, for example, are not some- 
thing that insurers in the  1950s and  1960s could reasonably have had much 
idea about. Insurers are also ignorant about potential losses from terrorist risk. 
(In the life-insurance domain, we are ignorant about the risks of a future AIDS- 
type epidemic.) 
Insurers and reinsurers are reluctant to provide protection against uncertain- 
ties and extremely reluctant to do so against events about which they are igno- 
rant. To provide coverage in such a situation would entail high risk and would 
allow for significant adverse selection since others could know much more. 
Beyond this, the decision maker-say  a manager as agent for shareholders- 
would be open to blame from shareholders: “Knowing nothing about it, how 
could you write insurance against that type of event?’ 
Changes in common risk can be significant when the time between when 
the losses occur and when the damages are paid is greater. This is a period 
when additional knowledge about true risks is learned and expected damage 
awards can change the most. The time lag varies  substantially for different 
lines of insurance. Table 6.2 shows the share of  losses incurred in  1986 that 
were paid within a given amount of time for different lines of property-casualty 
insurance. (Since data do not exist past  1995, we assume that all claims are 
paid within nine years.) For example, the first row shows that, for home/farm 
and commercial multiple-peril policies, 75 percent of the claims that are paid 
within the first nine years of the policy are paid within the first year (by the 
end of  1987) and 96 percent of the claims are paid within five years (the end 
of  1991). These claims tend to be paid very quickly; common-risk problems 
may thus not be particularly severe. 
For other types of risks, however, there is a much longer time between loss 
and recovery, creating greater risk. For example, only half of workers’ compen- 
sation claims are paid  within  the first year and only 91 percent  within  five 
years. Falling in between hornelfarm and commercial insurance and workers’ 
compensation are special liabilities (aircraft, ocean marine, and the like) and 
automobile liability. As a rough rule of thumb, losses involving personal injury 
impose a much greater common-risk problem than losses involving damage to 244  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Table 6.2  Cumulative Share of Losses by Payment Period (%) 
Line of Business 




Medical malpractice, occurrence 
Medical malpractice, claims made 
Products liability, occurrence 
Products liability, claims made 
Other liability, occurrence 
Other liability, claims made 
Years 
































Source: A. M. Best. 
Note:  Data are for incurred losses in 1986. Year  1 extends through 1987; year 5 extends through 
1991; and year 9 extends through 1995. There are assumed to be no losses after year 9. 
property since both risk levels and ultimate compensation arrangements are 
harder to judge.16 
We know of no estimates of the aggregate cost of common risks for insurers, 
but data are available for one such risk, real medical malpractice premiums 
from 1968 to 1993 (see fig. 6.3). Medical malpractice represents a small share 
of total property-casualty coverage-about  $5 billion in premiums annually. 
It is clear that malpractice premiums vary substantially over time. Between 
1968 and 1976, real premiums quintupled. Over the next decade, they nearly 
doubled again. Premium increases were followed by periods of real premium 
reductions. To the extent that these extreme premium fluctuations are the result 
of common-risk changes, they represent an enormous problem for insurers and 
the firms they are insuring. 
Summary 
For both  single-event and common risks, the probability of  a cataclysm 
seems quite real. Indeed, both single-event and common-risk cataclysms ap- 
pear to have  become more likely over time, and not merely because of  the 
growth of coverage. In the case of single-event risks, natural disasters appear 
to have increased in frequency and severity since the late 1980s. In the case of 
common risks, the past several decades have seen an explosion of liability in 
areas where insurers generally did not expect it, although some reforms have 
ameliorated the situation. 
16. With personal injuries, it is often difficult to determine what event led to the injury-hence, 
whether there is liability-and  whether compensation will depend on casualty. The breast implant 
case (see n. 15 above) is one example. Malpractice is a second. Studies suggest that many errors 
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6.3  Reinsurance for Catastrophes 
This section investigates how reinsurance premiums for catastrophic risks 
should be set and policies designed in the light of potential adverse selection. 
Although cast in reinsurance terms, our analysis applies immediately to any 
situation of adverse selection and insurance, including the classic one-stage 
insurance transaction between an insurer and a potential insured who possesses 
private information. Our goal in this analysis is efficiency. We seek the policy 
that is optimal for the insurer, given that the risk-neutral reinsurer breaks even. 
Our treatment allows for a single policy with a single ~remium.'~ 
We formalize the relationship between the primary insurer (buyer) and the 
reinsurer (seller) by assuming that there is a common prior probability distribu- 
tion on the likelihood of an occurrence but that the primary insurer has special 
knowledge about losses since he underwrote the original risk and has a more 
intimate relationship with the insured. We summarize this as a signal that the 
buyer of reinsurance receives about the likely distribution of losses. Obviously, 
the buyer is more likely to seek reinsurance protection-what  is often termed 
ceding insurance-when  he suspects that either the probability of the insured 
event is high or the magnitude of a given loss occurrence is high. Such behavior 
is the source of the adverse selection. 
17. Thus, we avoid Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) types of difficulties-e.g.,  do all policies need to 
break even?-when  there are multiple contracts in a world with multiple types. 246  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Before turning to our second-best solutions, we should observe that a fully 
optimal reinsurance contract could be drawn if payoffs were made contingent 
on objectively observable and verifiable conditions, such as the magnitude and 
path of a hurricane. Beyond any problems agreeing ex post on what occurred, 
such arrangements would suffer from “basis risk”-the  risk that a particular 
insurer’s losses would differ from average losses and thus that the insurer could 
not receive full reinsurance. If basis risk is significant or adverse happenings 
difficult to verify, we would expect reinsurance arrangements to depend on the 
experience of particular companies.18 
There are many strategies to ameliorate adverse selection. The contractual 
solution is to have the insurer provide the reinsurer with detailed and accurate 
statistical information on the insured risks. But more will be required if asym- 
metries remain, for example, about the tenacity with which a claim will be 
pursued. One approach is to arrange in advance (before the buyer receives his 
private information) for the buyer to pay the seller should a risk not be sold. 
Such a payment would make the buyer more willing to sell, thereby reducing 
adverse selection. More generally, reinsuring risks shortly after they are written 
makes it less likely that the buyer of reinsurance has superior information. 
A second strategy is nonlinear pricing depending on the proportion of the 
portfolio that is sold. The larger the portion of the buyer’s portfolio that he is 
reinsuring, the less opportunity for him to buy coverage for his worst prospects, 
what we term lemon shedding to contrast with the standard cherry picking. 
Thus, adverse selection would be discouraged if we simply reduce the per unit 
charge for reinsurance as a greater percentage of the portfolio is sold. 
A third approach is to use proportional reinsurance to ensure that the bad 
risks are not the only risks reinsured.’” But adverse selection  will remain a 
problem: insurance companies that wrote bad risks in general will be more 
eager to buy reinsurance than insurance companies that underwrote solid risks. 
Asymmetries  may  cut  in the opposite  direction. That is, reinsurers  with 
broader experience  may be able to assess some information more precisely 
than are the insurers for whom they are providing coverage. This suggests that 
they may selectively accept policies. Whatever reinsurers may know, private 
information will remain on the buy side and adverse selection will persist as a 
problem.  Moreover, if reinsurers as a group know information not known to 
insurers, a competitive market would prevent them from exploiting this differ- 
ential knowledge. The model that follows considers only adverse selection on 
the buy side.20 
18. We are grateful to Louis Kaplow for highlighting this point. 
19. Proportional reinsurance has the further advantage that, if the insured purchases multiple 
contracts with the same proportion, possibly from different parties, his insurance will address his 
total risk, which is his major concern. This is not true with nonlinear forms of  reinsurance. 
20. In ongoing work, we ax  exploring the problem of bilateral adverse selection in health care 
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We examine nonlinear pricing mechanisms as a means to ameliorate adverse 
selection.*’  We  start with the observation that the losses that an insurer realizes 
for insured asset i will be L, =  p,  . m,, where p,  is the probability of a loss, and 
m, is the magnitude of the loss if there is one. Both p,  and m, may vary in the 
population. We denote the prior distribution ofp  asf(p) and the prior distribu- 
tion of m as g(m).  The means of the two distributions are p  and E.  For simplic- 
ity,  we  assume that p  and  m are independent risks, with the result that the 
expected loss is E[L] =  p . M. 
Our mechanisms recognize the possibility that asymmetries may be greater 
on one of  these components than on the other. If  differential knowledge is 
greater on p than it is on m, or vice versa, a significantly nonlinear scheme of 
risk sharing is required to achieve a second-best solution. We do not expect to 
observe either pure case in the real world, but we  do expect some cases to 
be characterized by  asymmetry on the probability of  a loss and others to be 
characterized by  asymmetry on  the magnitude of  a loss. Unfortunately, the 
nature of the schemes in the two pure cases are quite different. This suggests 
that, when the buyer of reinsurance has superior information about both p and 
m, the second-best optimum may be relatively poor. 
We  develop our results by  employing a simple model with a risk-averse 
buyer of reinsurance and a risk-neutral seller (the buyer if often said to “cede 
insurance” to the seller). The buyer’s utility function is u(w) = -e-aw,  where 
w is wealth. The seller has utility function v(w)  = w.  If we think of sellers as the 
reinsurance market as a whole, risk neutrality may be a reasonable assumption 
provided that losses are below cataclysmic levels. 
6.3.1  Asymmetry on Probabilities 
Consider the situation where both buyer and seller have the same subjective 
distribution of the size of a loss should there be a loss, g(m).  The buyer and the 
seller differ in their knowledge of p;  the seller knows only the prior probability 
distribution on p,f(p),  while the buyer has more specialized knowledge of the 
loss probability. For example, the seller of reinsurance may know the flood risk 
in a particular city, but the buyer may know it for particular houses in the city. 
The insurer will choose to purchase reinsurance if  his houses at risk are in 
particularly high-risk areas. We  denote the buyer’s posterior probability of a 
loss as pb.22 
Since the buyer is risk averse, he is eager to lay off his loss, even at actuari- 
21. Essentially, we are engaged in a process of mechanism design for a situation of asymmetric 
information. Our risk-sharing arrangements in effect invoke the revelation principle: the optimal 
second-best mechanism can always be one that makes truth telling (in this case, by  the insurer) 
optimal. To  do this, the reinsurer must commit in advance how it will use the information it se- 
cures. We are grateful to John Cochrane for reminding us of this equivalence. For more discussion, 
see Myerson (1979). 
22. Since the asymmetry relates to a probability, it is only the mean of the buyer’s posterior 
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ally unfair rates. Since the size of the loss is a random variable, the seller can 
deter the buyer from putting unfavorable risks up for sale by making him bear 
a disproportionate share of small losses. 
The buyer has  initial wealth  w,  which includes the premium  that he has 
already collected. In the absence of reinsurance, his terminal wealth will be 
w -  m if there is a loss and w if there is not one. His expected utility, assuming 
no reinsurance, can be written as 
E[Ul =  pbs  -e-alw-mlg(m)dm  + (1 - p,) - e-aw. 
Ceding the Entire Risk 
Since the buyer is risk averse and the seller is risk neutral, it might seem that 
the buyer should purchase reinsurance for the entire risk at some preestablished 
price. However, when pb  is low enough, the primary insurer would rather bear 
the risk than pay the premium for reinsurance. 
Represent the price of  reinsurance  as r. If  the payment were the ex ante 
actuarial value of the loss, r = p  M.  The buyer would purchase for values of 
pb such that expected utility of being uninsured is below the expected utility 
of purchasing insurance, -  e-a[w-rl. 
This policy may not be feasible in the market, as a simple calculation re- 
veals. Let us say that a = 1, g(m)  is uniform on [0, 11, andf(p) is uniform on 
[O,  .1], implying M = .5, p = .05, and the ex ante actuarial premium would be 
.025 (S  X  .05). The buyer would purchase reinsurance whenever pb 2  .0352. 
But, for this value, the expected loss is .0388,23  which significantly exceeds the 
payment. No seller would take on the policy at the price of  .025. 
As the premium is increased, the buyer will be more reluctant to sell his 
risks. The dashed curve in figure 6.4 shows the valuep, above which the buyer 
will reinsure the risk, as a function of the premium for reinsuran~e.~~  The solid 
line is the actuarially fair premium as a function of the buyer’s cutoff probabil- 
 it^.^^ The point where the curves intersect is an equilibrium-the  seller breaks 
even given the degree of adverse selection and the buyer gains from the reduc- 
tion in risk. 
Table 6.3 shows information about possible equilibria for various insurance 
schemes for the parameters described above. For comparison, the first column 
shows the equilibrium with no reinsurance, and the last column shows the equi- 
librium with perfect reinsurance. The second column shows the equilibrium 
when the entire risk is ceded (whole reinsurance). The risk is assumed by the 
23. Since p is distributed uniformly, E[p  I p z p,] = ,0676. The expected loss is therefore ,0676 
24. The curve is slightly convex to the origin; a straightedge can assist the naked eye to demon- 
25. We  assume that the premium for the reinsurance, conditional on its being purchased, is 
X .5 = ,0338. 
strate this. 
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reinsurer 45 percent of the time, and, because of adverse selection, the equilib- 
rium price (.039) is well above the expected loss in the population as a whole 
(.025). 
Whole reinsurance is quite inefficient. For values of p below p’,  which oc- 
curs 55 percent of the time, there is no risk spreading even though risk spread- 
ing is socially desirable. The second row  shows the percentage gain in the 
primary insurer’s certainty equivalent, where 100 percent is the gain from per- 
fect reinsurance. Whole reinsurance provides only two-thirds of the benefit of 
perfect reinsurance. 
Risk aversion plays a critical role in determining when reinsurance will be 
purchased. Increased (diminished) risk aversion-an  increase in a-tilts  down 
(tilts up) the dashed curve and thus increases (decreases) the range over which 
reinsurance is purchased. If we double the degree of risk aversion locally (a = 
2),  for example, reinsurance will be purchased 69 percent of the time, and the 
realized gains will be 90 percent of the potential gains from perfect reinsur- 
ance. 250  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
Table 6.3  Comparison of Policies with Asymmetry on Probability of Loss 
Form of Reinsurance 
Measure 
Excess 
None  Whole  Proportion"  of Lossb  Perfect 
Percentage of time risk is 
Percentage gain in primary 
Premium ($)  ...  ,039  .03 I  .027  .025 
assumed by reinsurer  0  45  50  52  100 
insurer's certainty equivalent  0  68  71  72  100 
Note: Certainty equivalent is scaled to 0 percent in the no-reinsurance case and 100  percent in the perfect- 
reinsurance case. 
"Reinsurer bears 81 percent of risk. 
bReinsurer bears loss above ,152, where potential losses range from zero to one. 
As a contrast with whole reinsurance, we investigate nonlinear reinsurance 
arrangements. Two such arrangements are common: proportional reinsurance 
and excess-of-loss reinsurance. 
Proportional Reinsurance 
We begin by considering proportional risk sharing. We assume that the buyer 
pays the seller to take on a fraction b of the risk. This fraction must be such 
that, with adverse selection, the premiums just cover expected payouts. For the 
example given above, we find that the optimal fraction is for the reinsurer to 
assume 81 percent of the losses (b* = .81), charging a premium of .031 (see 
table 6.3).26  The premium is closer to the population average in this case than 
in the whole reinsurance case because the proportional policy induces less ad- 
verse selection. The buyer's  utility is greater under proportional reinsurance 
than under no reinsurance or whole reinsurance; 71 percent of  the potential 
gains to the buyer are realized. The superiority of proportional reinsurance to 
whole reinsurance is to be expected since the latter is a special case of propor- 
tional reinsurance where b = 1. 
Excess-of-Loss Reinsurance 
Risk-averse buyers particularly want reinsurance for large losses, while risk- 
neutral sellers are indifferent to the size of the losses that they reinsure. This 
fact can be used to limit adverse selection. By reinsuring only large losses, the 
most important risk spreading can be achieved, with adverse selection held to 
a minimum. 
26. The optimal policy, as with those considered later, is found by  computer simulation. Some 
of our differences in performance across policies are small. We did not engage in the modeler's 
equivalent of data mining: reworking parameters and functional forms to produce bigger differ- 
ences. The specific gains associated with different policies will depend on functional forms; the 
ranking of policies will not. 251  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
0.8 'I 
0.2 
1  ,, __,,.,  .,,'' // 
,  0'  I  I 
0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1 
Slze of  Loss (rn) 
Fig. 6.5  Optimal reinsurance with adverse selection 
We  consider arrangements for nonproportional, or excess-of-loss, reinsur- 
ance. As noted above, this is a common form of reinsurance in current markets. 
We  constrain such policies (and all policies in this paper) in two ways:  the 
buyer's share of the loss can never exceed 100 percent; and, at the margin, the 
buyer's share of losses can never exceed 100 percent. 
The optimal reinsurance arrangement subject to these constraints is shown 
in figure 6.5 and described in table 6.3. The policy has the buyer of reinsurance 
assume all risks up to m = .152. Beyond this point, the reinsurer assumes all 
losses (hence the title excess-of-loss).  Premiums are only slightly above the 
no-selection level, and 72 percent of the potential gains from reinsurance are 
realized. Indeed, we can demonstrate that, when there is asymmetry about the 
probability of a loss, excess-of-loss reinsurance is optimal.27 
PROPOSITION  1. When the buyer has no special knowledge of m but knows 
more than the seller about the probability of a loss, the optimal reinsurance 
27. An excess-of-loss policy will also he optimal when there is moral hazard on the probability 
of a loss (is., having insurance affects the loss probability) hut not on the magnitude of  a loss. In 
ongoing work, we are exploring optimal reinsurance with moral hazard. 252  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
policy charges the risk-averse buyer for all losses up to a point, with the risk- 
neutral seller responsible for losses beyond that point. 
PROOF.  See the appendix. 
Given the theoretical merits of excess-of-loss reinsurance and its common oc- 
currence in the real world, it might be logical to conclude that it is always the 
most-preferred  arrangement. This would be  a startlingly inappropriate  con- 
clusion. 
6.3.2  Asymmetry on Size of Loss 
We now consider situations where the primary asymmetry is on the magni- 
tude of loss, not its probability. For example, the insurer understanding  the 
litigation climate for toxic torts may have expectations about punitive damages 
that are not available to more distant reinsurers. Asymmetry about size of loss 
may apply as well for natural disasters. For example, a Korean insurance com- 
pany will likely have superior information relative to an overseas reinsurance 
about whether its clients’ buildings would survive an earthquake, whether fire 
services would be sufficient should there be one, etc. 
To simplify discussion, we assume that both the buyer and the seller of rein- 
surance believe in common that the probability of a loss is p.  However, assess- 
ments of  damage conditional on loss are asymmetrical. Specifically, we as- 
sume that the buyer knows the damage from a loss exactly, mb,**  and that the 
reinsurance seller has loss distribution g(m).  Thus, the buyer knows everything, 
while the seller knows nothing. 
Table 6.4 shows a variety of policies, each optimized for a different struc- 
ture, given this type of information asymmetry. For excess-of-loss reinsurance, 
it is optimal for the reinsurer to start to pay  at zero. In effect, the optimal 
excess-of-loss plan offers whole insurance. This in turn makes it more attrac- 
tive to buy insurance when losses will be small, helping deter adverse selec- 
tion. If there were a threshold for reinsurance coverage, the buyer would not 
purchase reinsurance for any losses below the cutoff, indeed, for some amount 
above it. Adverse selection would be severe. Even with the optimal plan of this 
type, risks are not laid off 60 percent of the time. 
Interestingly, when information asymmetry is about the magnitude of a loss, 
proportional reinsurance is superior to excess-of-loss reinsurance. The optimal 
policy has the reinsurer assume 89 percent of the risk, and the policy is pur- 
chased 42 percent of  the time. Even with proportional reinsurance, however, 
adverse selection has a large effect, as indicated by the substantial difference 
between premiums and average losses. 
28. In the case of  asymmetry about probabilities, a sufficient statistic for the buyer’s superior 
knowledge is the mean of his distribution, ph.  That is because rational decision makers are not risk 
averse on uncertainties about probabilities. With uncertainty about expected losses, we would need 
to summarize the entire probability distributions of the buyer and seller to characterize the market 
accurately. For simplicity, we assume that the buyer knows the actual value of a loss should it occur. 253  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
Table 6.4  Comparison of Policies with Asymmetry on Magnitude of Loss 
Form of Reinsurance 
Measure 
Whole/  Whole 
Excess  with  TWO 
None  ofLossa  Proportionb  Cap‘  Stepd  Perfect 
Percentage of time risk is 
Percentage gain in primary 
assumed by reinsurer  0  40  42  49  54  I00 
insurer’s certainty 
equivalent  0  80  81  85  87  100 
Premium ($)  ...  ,040  ,035  ,037  ,029  ,025 
Note: Certainty equivalent is scaled to 0 percent in the no-reinsurance case and 100 percent in the perfect- 
reinsurance case. 
aOptimal excess-of-loss reinsurance is whole reinsurance. 
bShare of time risk borne by reinsurer is 89 percent. 
‘Primary insurer starts paying at ,686. 
”Primary insurer starts paying ,486 and stops paying at .686, where potential losses range from zero to one. 
The next two columns show alternative reinsurance designs. The fourth col- 
umn  examines a “whole-with-cap” policy-a  policy  that has the reinsurer 
fully assume small losses and the primary insurer pay  for all losses above a 
cutoff (the optimal cutoff is .686). This is the opposite of  an excess-of-loss 
policy. The whole-with-cap policy is superior to the excess-of-loss policy; it is 
purchased 49 percent of the time, and 85 percent of the potential utility gains 
are realized. 
The last column considers a reinsurance arrangement where the reinsurer 
bears all small losses, the primary insurer bears a layer of losses, and the re- 
insurer then reassumes the risk. We  term this a mo-step policy.29  This policy 
outperforms all the other policies examined; it is purchased 54 percent of the 
time, and 87 percent of the potential utility gains are realized. Our simulations 
suggest that the two-step policy is the optimal reinsurance arrangement, al- 
though we do not currently have a formal proof that it is always best. 
Figure 6.5 compares the reimbursement structure of the optimal two-step 
policy and the optimal excess-of-loss policy from table 6.4. The optimal poli- 
cies for these two cases are strikingly different. While these results may appear 
puzzling, the intuition is readily grasped. Optimal reinsurance makes the buyer 
bear more of the risk on the dimension about which he has superior knowledge. 
If  the buyer knows more about the probability of  a loss than its magnitude, 
reinsurance should exclude coverage for the common small risks that are the 
source of exploitable adverse selection; this is exactly the “deductible-style” 
29. The optimal two-step policy has the first layer of no reinsurance up to losses of ,486, full 
reinsurance up to losses of ,686, and then no reinsurance above that point. 254  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
policy  that characterizes excess-of-loss insurance. If  the buyer knows more 
about the magnitude of loss than its probability, however, it is optimal to make 
it costly for him to buy reinsurance when he knows that the magnitude of loss 
is high. This is why the capped and two-step policies are desirable when the 
asymmetry is on the size of loss. 
6.3.3  Summary 
Optimal reinsurance policies differ significantly depending on the form of 
information asymmetry. If  the asymmetry in information is solely about the 
probability of a loss, the traditional excess-of-loss reinsurance contract is opti- 
mal. If the asymmetry is only about the size of a loss, however, it is preferable 
for the buyer to assume extreme losses as well as ordinary losses. Most real- 
world situations will involve elements of both asymmetries; hence, they will 
require future analysis to define the optimal policy structure. 
Current  reinsurance  arrangements  predominantly  use  proportional  or 
excess-of-loss reinsurance. If most of the asymmetry between buyers and sell- 
ers is about the probability of a loss, our results suggest that this is reasonable. 
However, if asymmetry is primarily about the magnitude of a loss rather than 
its probability-as  seems reasonable for many catastrophes-these  types of 
insurance arrangements may be far from optimal. Thus, reinsurance arrange- 
ments  might  be  considerably improved. Indeed, since our analysis  carries 
through to markets for primary insurance coverage as well, such contracts also 
might be improved. 
6.4  Reinsurance for Cataclysms 
Many important risks are common to all insurers. For example, an earth- 
quake in California will affect all insurers that provide coverage in that area. 
Similarly, changes in automobile-accident rates or tort-liability judgments for 
accidents will affect all insurers underwriting automobile insurance. Reinsur- 
ance can help diversify losses for any one insurance company, but, if the aggre- 
gate loss is sufficiently large, the capital of  the worldwide insurance and re- 
insurance industries may not be large enough to cover the losses. 
Cataclysms resulting from some common-risk changes are already spread 
relatively widely. If  automobile-liability  costs in the United States go up by 
10 percent in a year, for example, that may be serious for the automobile- 
insurance industry, but the risk will be widely spread since the geographic basis 
is wide and many different  insurers  will be involved. Far more significant 
would be an event with the same total damage but in a geographic region where 
some insurers are concentrated, such as an earthquake. Of course, diversifica- 
tion across areas of the country is less effective when a common risk happens 
and losses escalate. 
Both single-event and common-risk cataclysms have far-reaching implica- 255  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
tions. The Insurance Services Office, for example, estimates that a cataclysm 
on the order of $50-$100  billion could bankrupt one-third of all insurers. Un- 
reimbursed citizens will lose, and the government will almost certainly incur 
high costs in reconstructing public facilities, offering disaster aid to uncom- 
pensated victims, and suffering losses in tax revenues. 
6.4.1  Market-Based Responses to Cataclysmic Risk 
The market appears to have perceived the increase in cataclysmic risk in 
recent years and has taken steps to limit coverage for it. Often, this is accom- 
plished by withdrawing from the market. In the past few years, for example, 
insurers and reinsurers have withdrawn from homeowner’s insurance in Florida 
(as  Nationwide  did  recently)  and  California.  Insurers  and  reinsurers  also 
dropped coverage for terrorism risk in the United Kingdom after bombings in 
the early 1990s. These actions can make it impossible for people to buy insur- 
ance even for noncataclysmic losses. When insurers withdraw from the Florida 
homeowner’s market,  for  example,  homeowners  cannot  insure  themselves 
against even relatively minor losses. 
With many common-risk problems, insurers have responded by effectively 
shortening the life of the policies they sell. Medical malpractice and environ- 
mental liability are two common examples. In both these markets, traditional 
insurance was occurrence based. As the nature of long-term risk became more 
apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, insurers switched to a claims-made insurance 
policy, one that covers the policyholder only for claims filed in a particular 
period of time for damages occurring during that time. 
Insurers may prefer such mechanisms to raising their premiums to cover 
cataclysmic risk. Political or social considerations, for example, may prevent 
insurers from increasing premiums to the level required to insure against in- 
creasingly important cataclysms. In addition, the managers of the insurance 
company may  not want to risk insolvency even though the expected profits 
may be great.3o 
Table 6.2 above shows some evidence of how the market’s response to grow- 
ing cataclysmic risk affects firms and individuals seeking insurance. Under an 
occurrence-based  malpractice-insurance policy, only 6 percent of  losses are 
realized in the first year, and only two-thirds are realized within five years. In 
contrast, under a claims-made malpractice policy, 20 percent of the losses are 
borne in the first year, and 85 percent of the losses are borne within five years.31 
Hence, a claims-made policy has less long-tailed risk. Ignorance or uncertainty 
30. In theory, shareholders might like charging actuarial prices for risks that would not pay off 
in case of occurrence. Their losses on the downside are capped, raising the expected value of 
their investment. 
3  1. This ignores any differences in the types of policies that are sold on a claims-made or an 
occurrence-based basis. Because the longer-risk types of medical care are more likely to be sold 
as claims-made policies, this should reduce the loss difference in the two policies. 256  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
about  the losses  incurred  will  be reduced,  and premiums can be  set on  a 
sounder basis. Claims-made policies  have had  a  similar effect on product- 
liability coverage, although not other liability coverage. Curtailing the life span 
of insurance coverage returns the risk to insureds, whose premiums will rise 
and fall with estimates of coverage costs. This risk falls on the insured in part 
because most of the events covered by new-insurance purchases will have al- 
ready happened but not yet been compensated. 
The potential losses from common-risk cataclysms thus seem substantial. 
The market’s response to date has been largely to increase premiums for insur- 
ance, to reduce the extent of  coverage, and to limit exposure to long-tailed 
losses. The net result of these actions is to put much more risk back on the 
purchasers or insurance. The risk of  premium v~ability  over time thus be- 
comes a concern. The rest of this section examines other actions that could be 
taken to increase financial protection against cataclysmic losses. 
6.4.2  Reserves and Borrowing Capacity 
Typically, insurers build reserves so that they can pay for very large dam- 
ages. However, reserves are unlikely to be an effective means to deal with cata- 
clysms. 
It is a challenge for mutual insurance companies to build up substantial re- 
serves. Current policyholders, who may not be insured in the future, are likely 
to think that the reserves are their monies. Saving them for future policyholders 
who may  suffer cataclysms is hardly in their interest. Beyond this, when re- 
serves are significant, there is tremendous pressure on companies to demutual- 
ize and thereby distribute them.32 
For-profit insurers or reinsurers  could build reserves because  the money 
comes from and belongs to their shareholders. But the primary reason to build 
up reserves would be to reassure policyholders that the company will survive 
the  cataclysm.  Given  the  difficulty  of  communicating  information  on  the 
soundness of one’s company to policyholders, we would expect for-profit com- 
panies to have inadequate reserves for outlier losses. 
The government could regulate reserve levels to be adequate to meet a cata- 
clysm, but it might be a quixotic quest. If we wish an insurance company today 
to build up reserves against losses that are ten times an ordinary year’s losses- 
as, for example, a major hurricane might impose-then  it would have to charge 
an extra premium of 50 percent a year for twenty years to have enough money 
on hand. Not much is accomplished if the event occurs in year 7. And, while a 
regulator could require a for-profit reinsurer to raise enough capital to be pre- 
pared for a cataclysm, the reserves required may simply be too large to be prac- 
ticable. 
32. Demutualization has been widely observed for savings banks and could be an increasing 
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An  alternative approach to protecting against cataclysms is to have deep- 
pocket parties post bonds or their equivalent. This was the approach of Lloyd‘s 
of London. Rich people essentially placed their whole net worth at risk to cover 
potential future claims. The great advantage of  this “pledge” system for re- 
serves is that monies are kept working in high-valued uses until needed. The 
system proved less effective when it was called on severely, as Lloyd’s was 
when the rapid escalation of costs for asbestos and other changing liabilities 
exhausted its borrowing capacity. Even people who have made large amounts 
of money over many years, as many of the Lloyd‘s names did, get upset when 
a substantial portion of  their net worth is lost. Lloyd‘s is now reconstituting 
itself, but with more restricted obligations of  outside investors; presumably, 
this has diminished the security of its reinsurance capacity. 
Outside Lloyd‘s-type pledge arrangements, it may be possible for reinsurers 
to borrow to pay out cataclysmic losses, with the promise of future premiums 
as collateral. However, such borrowing might not be repaid for up to a century 
or more (in the case of a major earthquake) and would presumably be offered 
only at a substantial risk premium. 
In sum, traditional methods of diversification are unlikely to work well in 
the case of cataclysms. The next subsections discuss two alternatives that might 
be more effective. 
6.4.3  Securitization of Cataclysmic Risk 
Cataclysms may be large for the reinsurance industry but are generally small 
for the world‘s capital markets as a whole. A $100 billion earthquake loss, for 
example, would bankrupt a fair share of  the reinsurance industry but would 
represent only 2 percent  of  the New York  Stock Exchange asset value and 
less than 1 percent of the value of the U.S. capital market. Movements of this 
magnitude in net asset value in a month are the norm. Further, many cataclysms 
will be uncorrelated with economic conditions, and investments in cataclysmic 
risk could therefore help market investors diversify their portfolios. 
Thus, it seems promising to diversify cataclysmic risk in broader securities 
markets, much as is now done for home mortgages. Such diversification for 
risks is beginning to occur.33  Perhaps the best-known examples of the securiti- 
zation of sizable risks are the catastrophe options that have been traded on the 
Chicago Board of  Trade since 1992. For example, reinsurers can buy a call 
option that pays off if  aggregate losses are above a given level-perhaps  $5 
billion. The size of the payment would be directly proportional to the losses 
above $5 billion. The call could be sold by  firms that would do well in the 
event of a catastrophe-home  builders, for example-or  by general investors 
looking for a chance to diversify outside traditional securities markets. 
33. For a discussion of  securitization of  cataclysmic risk, see Borden and  Sarkar (1996) and 
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Other instruments for trading cataclysmic risks have been introduced, but 
they have been less popular than options. Contingent surplus notes, for ex- 
ample, guarantee the insurer buyers for its debt in the event of  a cataclysmic 
loss. Typically, money is taken up front and invested in Treasury securities, 
which can be exchanged for company bonds at the insurer’s discretion if  a 
cataclysm occurs. Nationwide Mutual completed such a transaction recently. 
Investors purchased $400 million in U.S. Treasury bonds, and Nationwide can 
convert the Treasury bonds to company notes in the event of  a catastrophe. 
Thus, Nationwide has access to a ready source of  cash in the event of a catas- 
trophe. Investors are compensated by  getting a higher return than a normal 
Treasury bond would yield. 
Catastrophe bonds (also termed act-of-God bonds) also yield cash from ca- 
tastrophes for insurers. These bonds have coupon payments that depend on the 
level of the insurer’s losses. As losses increase, insurers are not required to pay 
out as much and can use interest on the initial principle (and sometimes the 
principle itself) to pay out the unusually high claims. 
One concern with all these financial instruments for offering reinsurance 
protection is whether the triggering event should be company specific or mar- 
ketwide.  Insurers  and  reinsurers  would  naturally  want  to  have  company- 
specific securitization, other factors equal. Basis risk is an important issue for 
insurers,  and diversification against that risk  would bring  substantial  value 
(Major  1996). But company-specific securities make both adverse selection 
and moral hazard more likely. For example, insurers that know that they have 
financial market reinsurance might pay less attention to the loss probabilities 
or magnitudes of their insureds. A likely scenario is that securitization will be 
based on marketwide losses and that intermediaries will pool particular compa- 
nies into smaller groups approximating the market average, where risk spread- 
ing can be achieved but moral hazard and adverse selection minimized. 
To date, securitization of cataclysmic risk has been limited. Catastrophe op- 
tions, for example, trade less frequently than do most other options on the 
Chicago Board of Trade, and contingent-surplus notes and act-of-God bonds 
trade  relatively infrequently. This relative  illiquidity  has  probably  led  to a 
higher required  return for investors than would be required if  trading were 
more fluid. It  is unclear  whether  the  market  will ultimately  become large 
enough to support true cataclysmic diversification or whether other forms of 
reinsurance will be required. 
6.4.4  The Government as Reinsurer 
The government has a deep credit capacity: it can borrow by issuing debt 
far more readily than can private insurers or reinsurers,  and it can raise re- 
sources rapidly through its ability to tax.34  The ability to borrow or tax to meet 
34. The government might also build up reserves to pay for potential cataclysms, but such build- 
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cataclysmic obligations depends only on political capabilities. This puts the 
government in a natural position to be a reinsurer. The government can also 
compel reinsurance to solve the adverse-selection problems noted above. This 
is one of the traditional rationales for mandatory participation in social secu- 
rity, Medicare, and other public-insurance programs. 
The government is also a natural reinsurer because it is often called in to 
cover cataclysmic losses after they have occurred, whether it has contracted for 
them or  In the recent past, the government has bailed out many savings- 
and-loan institutions; these efforts will cost taxpayers money for many years 
to  The government will pay the cost of cleaning up its atomic-weapons 
waste  sites, estimated  at well  above $100 billion. The Price-Anderson  Act, 
which is no longer in effect, insured nuclear utilities against severe losses from 
individual accidents; the cutoff of private loss was $560 million. Governments 
also run  insolvency  funds that  bail  out policyholders  when  their  insurance 
company goes bankrupt. And, when hurricanes or floods occur, the government 
often provides disaster aid. 
Formal  government  reinsurance  programs  are  often  established  when 
primary-insurance  markets break  down. For example, the U.K.  government 
decided to provide terrorism insurance following the breakdown of insurance 
and reinsurance markets when the bombings in London began in 1992. High- 
risk homeowners’ pools in the United States typically get under way when the 
premiums that the private market would charge are above the levels that are 
socially acceptable. 
Establishing a formal reinsurance system, and thus collecting at least some 
money, may be preferable to waiting until the event occurs and spreading the 
costs more  broadly.  Selling insurance  in  advance  of  a disaster  also makes 
people aware of the social cost of their actions and thus limits moral hazard- 
for example, discouraging excessive building on floodplains. 
The government could price reinsurance at its expected cost or, alternatively, 
provide a subsidy to purchasers. A subsidy might be appropriate if the govern- 
ment is womed that people will not purchase insurance appropriately or if the 
government wants to share in the losses from a catastrophe the same way it 
shares when it receives additional tax revenue when there are not catastrophes. 
Flood insurance, for example, is heavily subsidized. Savings-and-loan insur- 
ance, pension-plan insurance (PBGC), and state insurance-guarantee funds of- 
fer a more subtle subsidy: they charge premiums but typically fail to differenti- 
ate the premiums on the basis of risk. For example, savings-and-loan premiums 
were the same for all institutions. As we saw, this encouraged risky activity for 
institutions near default. Similarly, the PBGC used to provide pension insur- 
35. Indeed, the probability of government involvement in certain cases may explain why insur- 
ance is only rarely purchased for some events (Kaplow 1991). 
36. The government also has the authority to order other parties to pay for damages, as it did 
with Superfund. The government’s unique capability to pass and enforce legislation-up  to the 
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ance at $19.00 per participant plus $9.00 per $1,000 in vested but unfunded 
benefits. However, there was a cap of $53.00 per participant. This created an 
incentive  to defund  a plan  once the  cap was  approached  or passed.  Many 
insurance-guarantee funds charge the same rate for all insurers, thus encourag- 
ing insurers to gamble with state funds if they are near bankruptcy and elimi- 
nating the need for individuals to think about the  solvency of  the company 
from which they purchase insurance. 
Because of these moral hazard problems, the government might want to pro- 
vide insurance at an actuarially fair cost. Indeed, if the government is providing 
reinsurance  solely  because  its  size allows  it to better  diversify  cataclysmic 
risks, that is a function that the market should be willing to pay full cost for. 
Some insurance has been proposed along these lines. The Treasury Depart- 
ment, for example, recently proposed public reinsurance for natural disasters 
with aggregate losses from $25-$50  billion. Reinsurance would be auctioned 
to insurers in amounts ranging from $1 to $25 million. Although this proposal 
has somewhat of  a market flavor, there are significant questions: Would the 
amount  auctioned  be  too  great  to  secure the  government  at least  actuarial 
prices? Would such insurance be pitched at too low a range, given the govern- 
ment’s inevitable financial responsibilities when losses exceed $50 billion? 
In other cases, government insurance is moving closer to actuarial pricing. 
For example, the Retirement Protection Act of  1994 eliminated any cap on 
PBGC per participant costs starting in  1997. As a result, the PBGC should 
come closer to risk-based pricing. 
One might question how the government  will know enough about appro- 
priate pricing to sell actuarially fair insurance when the government is the only 
insurance seller. The recent experience of the California Earthquake Authority 
(CEA) does not suggest that government authorities are well equipped to se- 
cure low prices for reinsurance. The CEA was seeking to purchase reinsurance 
for the layer between $7 and $8.5 billion over a four-year period. Its best esti- 
mate (based on scientific information) was that the layer would be reached with 
probability 1.2 percent, implying a fair market premium of $18 million. In the 
end, Warren Buffet sold the CEA this layer of reinsurance for $161 million per 
year. This is roughly ten times the estimated actuarial cost. 
To learn what prices the government ought to use in selling reinsurance, the 
government may wish to inject a sliver of private-sector pricing of cataclysmic 
risk to indicate how much it costs to provide. For example, the government 
could sell off a small portion of its book, say a total of 1 percent in 0.1 percent 
units. Then, if the government were responsible for $100 billion of risk, inves- 
tors could set prices for accepting risks up to $100 million. If the market price 
for a 0.1 percent share turned out to be $10 million, this amount would be paid 
to the investors, who would then take on the responsibility for this portion of 
the risk. Equally important, this rate would be charged to insurers who are 
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prices could be auctioned to the private sector on a basis that reflected the risks 
involved, the specific insurer, or both. 
The issue of basis risk adds complexity to such an auction scheme. Demand 
for reinsurance is likely to vary with the risk exposure of the particular com- 
pany. Companies with a broad nationwide exposure will find a claim based on 
aggregate losses well suited to its needs. Companies with concentrated risks in 
a particular area or type of catastrophe, however, will find such reinsurance 
policies less suitable. This variation in the ability to obtain hedging suggests 
that the price of the reinsurance policy may vary with total sales. The equilib- 
rium price will be high if little reinsurance is offered but low if a lot of reinsur- 
ance is offered. Determining how much reinsurance  the government should 
provide in such a situation is a difficult issue. 
Many countries use public insurance to address cataclysmic risk (although, 
to our knowledge, the private sector has not been involved in setting prices). 
Table 6.5  shows examples of  public-sector  reinsurance  programs  for cata- 
strophic risk: France, the Netherlands, Japan, Spain, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa,  and the United  Kingdom. Most of  the reinsurance programs 
cover natural disasters. In France, for example, flood losses that are particularly 
large are paid for by the national reinsurance company. The company collects 
premiums from a mandatory assessment on insurance premiums for property 
damage, business interruption, multirisk policies, and automobile insurance. 
Other countries cover events such as terrorism or political risk. 
Public-reinsurance systems have three advantages beyond their ability to ad- 
dress cataclysmic risk. First, if the government provides reinsurance for cata- 
clysms, it might allow a private market to develop for smaller aggregate losses. 
Second, public-sector reinsurance may address a moral hazard problem con- 
cerning government behavior. Many cataclysms can be ameliorated or magni- 
fied by government policy. Legal judgments, for example, vary with legislative 
and judicial actions. Decisions about where houses can be built will affect 
humcane and earthquake losses. By making the government the reinsurer for 
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these risks, the government  may internalize some of the costs of its actions. 
Third,  if  government  is  the  insurer of  last  resort  anyway, a formal  public- 
reinsurance system may raise revenues for this service. Of course, if insurance 
would be provided without the government, government involvement may just 
lead to a subsidy of risky activities that is not warranted. 
6.4.5  Cataclysms and Learning about the Future 
The occurrence of a cataclysm may affect our predictions about the magni- 
tude of losses in the future. On one side, a cataclysm may eliminate the highest- 
risk situations; an earthquake may bring down the weakest buildings and re- 
lease stress in a fault. Moreover, once society is alerted to the risk, it may take 
actions, say, reinforcing buildings, that will make the risk less likely or less 
costly in the future. 
Cataclysms may also portend greater future losses if they result in an updat- 
ing of event probabilities or the distribution of loss magnitudes. If we think the 
weather may be changing, then a humcane this year may suggest additional 
hurricanes in future years. And, if losses are surprisingly high given a hurri- 
cane, we may conclude that future hurricane losses will be greater than we 
had anticipated.”  This is anecdotally what occurred after Hurricane Andrew 
in Florida. 
When  cataclysms  lead  to  updating  in  this  fashion,  a  second  major  risk 
arises-the  risk that premiums will rise in the future (Cochrane 1995; Cutler 
1996). For example, the liability  crisis of the 1970s and  1980s was caused 
much more by a rapid escalation in premiums than by any set of events that in 
themselves imposed substantial  Just as costs escalated dramatically for 
insureds, so too did they  for insurance companies  seeking to reinsure risks. 
Insurers, presumably being more risk averse than  those selling reinsurance, 
would probably have liked to have insured their future premiums as well.39  But 
this insurance was not provided. 
Indeed, reinsurance to protect against future premium  increases is rarely 
issued, for three reasons. First, the insured has a quantity choice to make (the 
amount of insurance to purchase), which would be distorted if rates were not 
equal to current actuarial costs. Second, no reinsurer could bear the risk associ- 
ated with protecting  its customers  against future  increases in premiums.  It 
would be offering protection against common-risk cataclysms. The exposure 
would be monumental. Third, a large up-front payment would be required to 
37. For most statistical models, the more extreme the event, the more significant is the updating 
of future probabilities. Thus, the Occurrence of a $25 billion hurricane will increase estimates of 
future event likelihoods and costs more than the occurrence of a $5 billion hurricane. 
38. Macroeconomic factors such as inflation and high interest rates were also important in the 
liability crisis. 
39. This is analogous to having future health-insurance premiums guaranteed even if the person 
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prevent insurance purchasers from leaving the contract if insurance premiums 
decline. Charging in this fashion seems impractical. 
Current insurance arrangements generally put the buyer of insurance at risk 
for premium increases and decreases over the period of the policy, usually one 
year or (in a claims-made policy) somewhat longer. If there is little movement 
in expected costs from year to year, say, because there is little learning, this 
risk is minimal. However, experience over the past several decades suggests 
that expectations of  future costs change substantially, and thus variability  in 
premiums is large. 
To determine how important learning about future losses is, we use the PCS 
data to determine how predictions of losses should be updated over time. We 
assume that expected losses in any year are a function of expected losses in 
the previous year and the actual loss experience in the previous year: 
E[L,+,]  =  (Y  '  L, + (1 - a)  '  E[L,]. 
The coefficient  (Y  is the weight on the previous  year's  losses.4o  Therefore, a 
will be greater than zero if the world changes fundamentally over time in a 
way that insurers had not predicted. For example, if the underlying cause of 
North American hurricanes (perhaps weather conditions in sections of Africa) 
changes in such a way  that more hurricanes are likely, this would be repre- 
sented first as an increase in current hurricane losses, which then feeds back 
into expected future hurricane damage. 
Actual damages in any year are expected damages times an error term: 
where E is normally distributed with variance u2.  The second term in the error 
term is an adjustment to make the mean of actual losses equal to the mean of 
expected losses. 
Equations (2)  and (3)  can be estimated for (Y and u2  and expected losses in 
the first year of the data. Combining all the catastrophes, our estimate of a  is 
.02, with a standard error of  .01.4' 
To understand what this implies about premium variability, we simulate pre- 
miums and losses using  equations (2) and (3). We simulate thirty  thousand 
separate three-hundred-year time-series paths. We exclude the first one hun- 
dred years of  the simulation to avoid start-up effects, with the result that we 
have effectively 6 million years of data. 
Table 6.6 summarizes these simulations. The first columns show results for 
a = .02; the second column shows results for a  = .20. The higher level of (Y 
40. Estimates using average losses in the previous few years instead of just the past year yielded 
41. We attempted to estimate the model separately for different types of risks (particularly huni- 
very similar results. 
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Table 6.6  Simulated Losses from Premium Variability ($ million) 
Weight Placed on Current Year’s Losses 
Loss Distribution 
01 = .02  (Y = .20 








Average of percentiles: 
Mean 10th percentile 
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Nore: Based on 30,000 simulations each of 200 years’ duration. The degree to which expected 
losses change with current-year losses is given by a.  The second block shows the distribution of 
the average premium or loss across the 30,000 simulations. The third block shows the distribution 
of the 10th percentile premium or loss within each simulation and the 90th percentile premium or 
loss within each simulation. 
is meant to proxy for a market with a greater degree of persistence in innova- 
tions. The first rows of the table show the mean premiums and losses across 
all years of  the  simulation. Not  surprisingly, mean  premiums  match  mean 
losses for each value of 
Our first measure of premium variability is the distribution of the average 
premium. That is, if an insurer cares only about the average premium over a 
two-hundred-year period, how variable is that average premium? This would 
be the relevant measure of variability for an insurer that was able to borrow 
and lend costlessly but was worried about what its average repayment over a 
long period of time would be. 
We  show the distribution  of  average premiums and losses for each two- 
hundred-year simulation in the second block of the table. Over a two-hundred- 
year period, average premiums are distributed essentially the same as average 
losses. For each value of a,  the tenth percentile of average premiums is essen- 
tially the same as the tenth percentile of average losses, and the same is true at 
other points in the distribution. Thus, for a given level of  (Y,  insurance helps 
spread the risk that actual losses in a year will substantially exceed the mean, 
but it offers little benefit in reducing the spread in average losses for the two- 
hundred-year period. There are large differences in the variability of premiums 
as (Y changes, however. The ninety-ninth percentile average premium for the 
42. The mean loss for (Y  = .20 is above the mean loss for 01  = .02 because of  sampling vari- 
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case of  CI = .20 is over six times greater than the ninety-ninth percentile pre- 
mium for the case of CI = .02. 
Not all insurers are risk neutral over a two-hundred-year horizon, however. 
Bankruptcy fears or agency costs may make insurers care about losses at a 
greater frequency than the long-run average. Our second measure of variability 
captures this issue. We  show the average value of premiums or losses across 
simulations. That is, if  one thought about the ninetieth percentile premium 
within the two-hundred-year period, what is the average value of that number? 
To the extent that the average value of the ninetieth percentile premium is sub- 
stantially  above the average value of  the average premium, the within-time- 
period risk will be substantial. 
We show the distribution of these percentiles in the lower panel of the table. 
It is clear that insurance has an important role to play in this case. For the case 
of a  = .02, the average value of the ninetieth percentile premium is 45 percent 
below the average value of the ninetieth percentile actual loss. But the ninetieth 
percentile premium is 16 percent above the premium that would be required if 
insurers could reinsure the risk associated with variation  in expected losses 
(the premium for this would be the overall average loss, $2.7 billion). For the 
case of  ci  = .20, the ninetieth percentile premium is 160 percent  above the 
unconditional mean loss. The losses to an insurer from premium variability 
due to changing loss processes may be substantial. 
While current insurance arrangements generally either fix premiums over 
time or vary them fully with annual changes in expected losses, respectively 
placing  all risk on the insurer or insured, other arrangements  are possible. 
Some would share the burden of premium increases between the insurer and 
the insured. This type of “premium sharing” could perform a function much 
like  insurance and risk  sharing. The optimal  form of  premium  sharing, of 
course, will depend on the utility  function of  the insured and insurer. If the 
two parties have exponential utility, albeit with different parameters, then they 
should bear local and global risks in proportion to those parameters. Side pay- 
ments at the outset provide for movements along the Pareto frontier. By con- 
trast, if both parties have utility functions where wealth is raised to a power, 
the logarithm being a special case, then they should proportionally share the 
total pie, including initial wealths. Movements  along the Pareto frontier are 
achieved by varying the sharing percentage. In both situations, once a division 
of welfare is agreed on, all risks are shared in the same proportion (see Wilson 
1965).43  In our model, the risks are experienced as expected costs per period 
and in variability about those expected costs. 
In theory, if  firm contracts could be drawn for such situations, the parties 
would share increases and decreases in premiums in the same percentage that 
they shared any actual losses. In practice, it will not be possible to work out 
43. Pratt and Zeckhauser (1989) show that this is the only case for which sharing is propor- 
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such sharing arrangements owing to the insecurity of premium promises. But 
we should recognize that the present situation, where insureds pay a small pro- 
portion of losses when period losses are great but bear virtually all the variabil- 
ity in premiums, is far from optimal. 
6.5  Conclusion 
Catastrophic and cataclysmic losses are an increasing concern for insurance 
companies, reinsurers, and society. In recent years, losses have escalated be- 
cause of both unpleasant surprises in natural disaster magnitudes and a chang- 
ing liability  game. Some major insurers have become  insolvent;  many have 
been restructured or sold under duress. Insurance difficulties impinge on the 
public through  premium boosts and the disappearance of insurance in some 
markets. Ultimately, economic activity suffers. 
Such developments suggest that it is important to insure the insurers. Rein- 
surance markets are booming, but past reinsurance structures may be inade- 
quate to today’s markets. Reinsurers are likely to be less familiar with the risks 
that they are insuring than their insureds, both because the reinsurance market 
is increasingly globalized and because new risks, such as those related to tech- 
nology or terrorism, need to be insured and reinsured. As a result, asymmetri- 
cal information and adverse selection are likely to be problems. If the asymme- 
try is on the magnitude of the loss, standard reinsurance frameworks-such  as 
excess of loss or proportional-are  inappropriate. 
Cataclysmic  losses-those  that overwhelm insurance markets-are  more 
common than they used to be. Cataclysms can stem from both  single events 
and common risks. While new financial instruments are bringing additional 
liquidity to insurance markets, the government has substantial advantages as a 
reinsurer given its deep credit capacity. Although putting government insurance 
on a sound financial basis, say, by taking guidance from private transactions, 
is perhaps an unlikely step, it would contain the dangers of bureaucratic opti- 
mism and political interference. 
Nature and the economy, not to mention government processes, are throwing 
risks at us on a grand scale. Significant innovation will be required if insurance 
and reinsurance markets are to make a sufficiently grand response. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The insurer can choose to purchase reinsurance or not. Denote utility if  the 
insurer does not purchase reinsurance as U, and utility if the insurer purchases 
reinsurance as U,. These utility functions are given by 267  Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms 
where Y is premium income, IT  is the reinsurance premium, pb  is the probability 
(known to the insurer) of experiencing a loss, m is the realized loss, and O(m) 
is the insurer's payment if he has purchased reinsurance. Em signifies that the 
expectation is taken with respect to the random variable m. The first term in 
each utility function is utility if there is no loss. The second term is utility when 
there is a loss. 
Let p,* be the probability where the insurer is indifferent between purchasing 
and not purchasing reinsurance  (UN  = V).  We can express the difference in 
utility U'  -  UN  as the sum of two terms: the difference in utility when there is 
no loss, {  (1 -  p,) [  U(  Y -  ~r)  -  U(  Y)]},  and the difference in utility when there 
is a loss, (p,Em[U(Y -  TI -  O(m)) -  U(Y -  m)]}.  Notice that, if there is no 
loss, utility is lower if  insurance has been purchased than if  it has not been 
purchased since a premium was paid with no recovery. If there is a loss, how- 
ever, expected utility will be greater with insurance than without. The insurer 
with pb =  pz  is the firm where these two terms exactly balance each other. 
Now consider any pb >  p,*. For each of these firms, the weight placed on 
expected utility when there is a loss is greater, and the weight placed on utility 
without a loss is smaller, than for the firm with ph = p,*. Thus, each of these 
firms will find reinsurance more attractive than does the firm with p, = p,*. 
Therefore, all firms with p, >  p,* will purchase reinsurance, and all firms with 
p, <  p,* will not purchase reinsurance. 
Combining equations (Al),  p,* is determined as 
U(Y)  -  U(Y -  Tr) 
(A2)  pz = u(y)  -  u(y -  + Em[u(Y  -  -  e(m)) - u(y - 4' 
The reinsurance premium ~r*  is the average reinsurance payment conditional 
on having a loss (the loss less the primary insurer's payment) times the proba- 
bility that a firm purchasing insurance has a loss. This is given by 
(A31  IT*  =  (Em[m1  - E,,,[Wm)ll . E[p,lp,  > ~,*l. 
The optimal reinsurance policy maximizes expected utility over p6.  If there 
were only one pb,  full insurance would be optimal (O[m] = 0). With differing 
values of p,,  however, only the firms with higher p, will purchase insurance. 
To combat adverse selection, think about increasing O(m) on the first dollar 
of  losses. As this is done, the premium falls by the expected primary-insurer 
payment. Starting from the point of full insurance, this reduction in coverage 
has no welfare cost for firms already purchasing reinsurance. For firms at the 
margin of purchasing reinsurance, however, the reduction in reinsurance cover- 
age is attractive; reinsurance  is actuarially  overpriced for this group. Thus, 
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reinsurance premium by even more, benefiting the firms that were already pur- 
chasing insurance. Thus, incomplete reinsurance will be optimal. 
To design the optimal reinsurance policy, consider a given amount of total 
cost sharing in the reinsurance policy, Em[8(m)].  The direct effect of this cost 
sharing on the reinsurance premium (eq. [A3])  is independent of where in the 
distribution of rn this cost sharing occurs. But selection and welfare of insurers 
purchasing reinsurance depends on how this cost is determined. Note that firms 
purchasing reinsurance  want to design cost sharing to maximize Em[  U(  Y - 
I -  O(rn)]. Maximizing this value also reduces p,* the most (eq. [A2]). 
Thus, the goal is to design the reinsurance policy that maximizes Em[  U(  Y - 
I  - O(m))] over  all  the policies  with  the  same level  of  total  cost  sharing 
E,[O(m)]. Given risk aversion, the most valuable insurance to provide is that 
for the greatest risks; the next most valuable insurance  is that for the next 
highest risk; and so forth. Thus, the optimal policy must insure all the high 
risks up to the point where the budget constraint is met. This is exactly the 
excess-of-loss policy described in the text. 
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Comment  John H. Cochrane 
This paper is an ambitious survey. It is full of interesting anecdotes, facts about 
reinsurance, and speculations about forces that might move reinsurance con- 
tracts in one direction or another. While much time could pleasantly be spent 
going through the paper and discussing each issue that it raises, instead I will 
concentrate on the central analytic point. Here’s the setup: m denotes the size 
of the loss if there is one, with probability g(m).  The probability that any loss 
occurs is p.  This probability  is random, too, andf(p)  is the “probability of 
probability”  p.  The original  insurer  may  have better  information  about the 
probability of lossf(p) or about the distribution of the size of losses g(rn). 
1 emphasize that the issue here is, not the probability  structure itself, but 
direrences between  the insurer’s knowledge  and the reinsurer’s knowledge. 
The fact that we are all uncertain about what probabilities to attach to cataclys- 
mic events has nothing to do with adverse selection. 
The central point is stated right up front: “When the asymmetry is on the 
probability of a loss [f(p)]  but not its magnitude  [g(m)],  the optimal reinsur- 
ance contract is a standard ‘excess-of-loss’ policy [deductible]. . . . When the 
asymmetry is over the magnitude of the loss [g(m)],  the optimal reinsurance 
policy covers smaller losses as well as large losses but leaves the primary in- 
surer exposed for some large losses [risk sharing].” I think that this proposition 
is a misleading summary of what we learn from the analysis in the paper. 
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All that can matter to the optimal contract is each player’s probability distri- 
bution over final outcomes-losses  m in this case. Since there are no interme- 
diate moves, the sequence of signals must be irrelevant. Thus, suppose that you 
get to distributions over final outcomes by different values for p.  You  obtain 
exactly the same optimal contract if you get to those distributions over final 
outcomes by different values for g(m).  The labels uncertainty over probabili- 
ties and uncertainty over losses must be meaningless in terms of the optimal 
contracts that they generate. 
What about Cutler and Zeckhauser’s examples? 
Both  the  “asymmetric information  about  probability”  example  and  the 
“asymmetric information about losses” example generate situations in which 
the reinsurer knows that he faces an original insurer that has one of two prob- 
ability distributions over final events. He has to design a clever schedule of 
payments as a function  of  losses to separate out original insurers with one 
versus the other type of probability distribution. 
The examples differ in what the two types of final distributions over out- 
comes are. It should not be a surprise that contracts designed to separate people 
with one pair of probability distributions over final outcomes are different from 
contracts that separate people with much different pairs of such distributions. 
In fact, the paper has a very nice exposition of  the intuition for this result: 
“If the buyer knows more about the probability of  a loss than its magnitude, 
reinsurance should exclude coverage for the common small risks that are the 
source of  exploitable adverse selection; this is exactly the ‘deductible-style’ 
policy that characterizes  excess-of-loss insurance. If  the buyer knows more 
about the magnitude of loss than its probability, however, it is optimal to make 
it costly for him to buy reinsurance when he knows that the magnitude of loss 
is high.” 
This intuition is right on the money, but notice that it concerns only the 
uncertainty that reinsurers have about the original insurers’ probabilities over 
jinal outcomes, not how one gets there. Another way to put the point is that, in 
general, the uncertainty over probabilities  and the uncertainty over distribu- 
tions are not separately identified by  the uncertainty  over distributions over 
final outcomes. One can tell the difference between these two only in highly 
structured and stylized examples. In this case, the crucial “identifying assump- 
tion” is that g(m)  places no weight on m = 0. Absent that identifying assump- 
tion, we can rewrite the uncertainty in probability example as an uncertainty 
in distribution example, and you would never know the difference between 
the two. 
These are also perfectly  standard results  in the theory of insurance-for 
example, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Kreps (1990,668). These days, one 
usually finds optimal contracts with the “revelation principle” rather than by 
the supply-and-demand methods used in this paper (or at least the conference 
draft). A risk-neutral insurer offers a contract to a risk-averse consumer. The 
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of losses. To find the optimal contract-the  optimal payment given each pos- 
sible loss-we  maximize the insurer’s profits  subject to the constraints  that 
each type of consumer will accept the contract he is offered and that each type 
of consumer will correctly reveal his type. In equations, one solves problems 
like the following: 
PROBLEM.  Choose state-contingent payment to maximize insurer profit 
max,4(m,,))  Pr(A)C T:q(m,,A)  +  Pr(B)C T,Bq(m,,B) 
(where Pr[A] = insurer’s probability that consumer is type A, mt = loss in state 
i,  T: = type A probability of loss mz,  and q[ml,  A] = net payment if consumer 
says type A and loss is m,)  subject to (1) type A consumers accept the contract: 
CT:U[W  - m, - q(ml, A)]  2 CT:U(W  - m,); 
I 
(2) type B consumers accept the contract: 
CT~U[W  - m, - q(ml, B)]  2 CT;U(W  - m,); 
, 
(3) type A consumers do not pretend that they are type B: 
(4) type B consumers do not pretend that they are type A: 
We know how to solve problems like this and how to find optimal contracts. 
The optimal contracts behave just as Cutler and Zeckhauser find in their ex- 
amples. There will be less insurance-deductibles,  caps, copayments, etc.- 
in the range of outcomes where the possible probabilities differ the most or 
“odds ratios” are highest. In fact, one can reverse engineer problems like this 
to find an assumption about the nature of private information to generate any 
desired sharing rule or contract. 
In sum, these examples are perfectly standard insurance theory. They have 
nothing special to do with reinsurance or cataclysms, and the results-the  de- 
gree to which different sizes of loss are covered-depend  only on probability 
distributions over final outcomes, not in any fundamental way whether those 
distributions are generated by “uncertainty over probabilities” or “uncertainty 
over losses given there is a loss.” If one wants to avoid revelation-principle 
constructions, then either one has to find a new, restricted definition of optimal 
contract, or one is just showing a different implementation  mechanism for a 
revelation-principle contract. 
I do not mean to sound critical. I think that it is a good thing that the analysis 
in this paper comes down to perfectly  standard theory. Thousands of papers 
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would be astounding if this paper came up with  an original theory. I much 
prefer papers that apply standard theory to interesting practical  situations. It 
gives me comfort as an economist that we do not have to invent a new and 
clever theory  for every situation. I  am in the  same boat. The paper  I  wrote 
(Cochrane 1995) that got me invited to this conference applied contract theory 
so old-fashioned there was not even private information. The point of the above 
forest of equations is constructive. It is a suggestion for how Cutler and Zeck- 
hauser can actually compute optimal contracts in the situation that they ana- 
lyze, rather than analyzing the relative merits of arbitrary contracts. 
But, while there have been thousands of papers working out the theory, there 
have been almost no papers that try to see whether this beautiful theory has 
anything to do with our world. Is there really any asymmetric information, and 
what form does it in fact take? Let  us  reverse engineer-observed real-world 
contracts and see if the required uncertainty about insurer’s probability distri- 
butions over losses makes any sense. Let us examine what information we have 
on actual insurer’s probability distributions. Along this path, completing the 
marriage of  theory and detailed industry knowledge toward which I see this 
paper working, I think that Cutler and Zeckhauser can end up with something 
really useful. 
This said, I must voice my skepticism. Of the standard textbook problems 
with insurance contracts, of all the impediments to cataclysm reinsurance, is 
adverse selection-asymmetric  information over the probability distribution 
of losses-really  the most important? 
Adverse selection is already not so obvious for people. Do you really know 
more about your health on the basis  of your aches and pains  than  a doctor 
armed with your medical history and actuarial tables? For institutions-insur- 
ance companies  selling to reinsurers-asymmetric  information  seems even 
more tenuous. Anything that an institution knows and can act on is written 
down somewhere and can be shared with a reinsurer. 
Furthermore, the uncertainties about the probability  of  cataclysmic losses 
that many of us have commented on during this conference argue to me against 
asymmetric information as a serious problem. The heart of asymmetric infor- 
mation problems is that the reinsurer does not want to offer a contract and have 
only those original insurers who know the probabilities are a lot worse than it 
thinks they are take the contract. It is not enough that the insurers happen to 
believe that the probabilities are a lot worse: so long as the insurers do not 
know a lot more than the reinsurer does, the reinsurer will not discover ex post 
a surprisingly large exposure, and contracts will work fine. If nobody knows 
the right probabilities, there will be little information and lots of confusion as 
to correct pricing. But there will not be asymmetric information and adverse 
selection. 
We can think of testing for adverse selection rather than intuiting or investi- 
gating the extent of asymmetric information. I just read an interesting paper 
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important in life insurance. The theory, like that presented here, predicts that it 
should be cheaper to buy a little insurance than a lot of  insurance, to keep 
really sick people from loading up on insurance. Insurers should make sure 
that consumers do not undo this size premium by getting insurance from sev- 
eral different companies. But, in fact, there are volume discounts, and insurers 
do not care if you take out multiple policies! Cawley and Phillipson also find 
that insurers, with good actuaries and models, have better information than 
customers on likely life spans! 
So bring on the empirical work. Cutler and Zeckhauser seem ideally ready 
to do a similar exploration of the catastrophe-reinsurance market. But, as with 
life insurance, let us be prepared to find that, although adverse selection fasci- 
nated a generation of theorists, it might not have much to say about many actual 
insurance contracts. 
A word of caution, however. Adverse selection leads to nonlinear risk shar- 
ing, but not every nonlinear contract means adverse selection. For example, 
consider a company that is hedging oil-price or interest rate risk in derivatives 
markets. It will sign many contracts with highly nonlinear payouts, payouts 
that look like “deductibles,” “caps,” “slices,” and so forth. But, obviously, the 
structure of these securities has nothing to do with adverse selection. Analo- 
gously, I think that it could be very dangerous to jump to an adverse-selection 
interpretation  of  nonlinear  contracts in an  increasingly  securitized  reinsur- 
ance market. 
Of the textbook asymmetric information stories, I would guess that asym- 
metric information about how big the losses really are once they have hap- 
pened is a far bigger problem. You do not just call up your reinsurer and say, 
“It rained a bit. Send us that check for $100 billion.” The contracts must be 
carefully written and triggered on events that can be easily verified and not 
subject to manipulation. Currently, reinsurance and even the exchange-traded 
cat options are triggered on reports of industry losses. To  a cynic like me, this 
places an extraordinary amount of faith in accountants, adjusters, and reporting 
services. But, by focusing attention on this issue and giving an incentive for the 
production of good indices, the process of securitization seems likely to help. 
I would also follow much of the discussion here and guess that loss reserves, 
liquidity, capital, etc. are crucial issues. David Cutler asked the question, “Who 
should pay?’ The answer is that we all should pay. The (Pareto-)optimal re- 
sponse to a large shock is that everyone should pitch in a bit. The question is, 
What institutions or securities best implement this result? 
We  worry that cataclysms, although trivial compared to national  wealth, 
nonetheless can exhaust reserves, setting off a chain of bankruptcies. Yet tying 
up more reserves in liquid assets-building  up capital to cover the largest cata- 
clysm-is  obviously inefficient. 
The central problem is limited liability. The answer, it seems to me, is more 
widespread use of securities that allow some liability. Each $10,000 of a pen- 
sion fund should include a security, or  just a contractual arrangement, that costs 274  David M. Cutler and Richard J. Zeckhauser 
nothing, gets, say, $5.00 per month premium, but exposes the fund to a liability 
of up to,  say, $100 in cataclysm  or calamity events. The current pricing of 
catastrophe reinsurance means that these securities earn very large expected 
returns even  though  they  are uncorrelated  with  other  security  returns.  One 
could come close to this  arrangement  with the cat options that are already 
traded. 
This arrangement allows us all to share in the risk, which is still, after all, a 
small fraction of total wealth. It does so without the need for huge inefficient 
loss reserves or the distortions and inefficiencies of implicit government catas- 
trophe insurance by ex post taxation. The design, implementation, and market- 
ing of such securities seems to me the most promising response to the issue of 
cataclysm reinsurance. Of course, pension funds must be allowed to hold such 
securities, so, in the end, regulation may be the reason that we do not already 
all share in catastrophe risk, and regulatory change may be an important step 
in allowing us to do so. 
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